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COMMENTARY
A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO
LAW AND ORGANIZING:
A COMMENT ON "THE STORY OF
SOUTH ARDMORE"
SCOTT L. CUMMINGS*

Professor Corey Shdaimah weaves a rich and compelling story
about legal mobilization in the context of public school
redistricting that offers important insights into the complex
choices that face activists in organizing campaigns.' As part of this
symposium commemorating the birth of Saul Alinsky, it is fitting
that her story grows out of her own experiences as a parent in
South Ardmore, since one of the central tenets of Alinskyism was
that organizing efforts should evolve organically out of the needs of
local communities. 2 Shdaimah's article provides an excellent
synthesis of the literature on law and organizing, and deftly uses
the South Ardmore campaign to illuminate the opportunities and
constraints that exist when an organizing group turns to law as
one means to pursue its ends. It is a story that is unfinished, so we
have only a window into the difficult decisions that organizers
have to make about legal strategy and the trade-offs such choices
involve. We do not know whether the choices were ultimately
justified by the result. Nonetheless, Shdaimah's story adds weight
to the evidence that activists often view law as a powerful resource
and invoke it as a conscious strategy of social reform, fully aware
of its potential pitfalls. 3 She ends with a call for a more "fluid way
of thinking about" law and organizing efforts-a position which I
share. 4 Toward this end, Shdaimah suggests that we resist a
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
1. Corey Shdaimah, Lawyers and the Power of Community: The Story of
South Ardmore, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 595 (2009).
2. SAUL ALINSKY, RULES FOR RADICALS (1971).

3. See Scott L. Cummings, Critical Legal Consciousness in Action, 120
HARv. L. REV. F. 39 (2007), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/
issues/120/febO7/cummings.pdf (reviewing the literature).
4. Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and
Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 517 (2001) (suggesting that scholars and

activists view law and organizing as part of a "pragmatic, multifaceted vision
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totalizing theory of law and organizing and, instead, approach the
question of what role law can play in social change by asking:
'What makes sense to this community? What makes sense in this
context?"5 In this brief comment, I take these questions as an
invitation to reflect on the context-specific factors that may
influence whether turning to law "makes sense" in an organizing
campaign. The list is partial-a preliminary set of variables and
questions rather than a systematic framework.
To give this list meaning, it is useful to start by clarifying a
central operating premise of the law and organizing framework,
which views law as subservient to organizing. It is not self-evident
why-in a society suffused with law-legal action should be
viewed as requiring justification as a tool of social change. If "law
is politics," then why is law seen as an inferior form (at least from
the point of view of progressives), while organizing is praised for
its political authenticity? I suggest two main answers, each giving
rise to a set of important concerns about law as a tool of social
change that are commonly raised in scholarly and activist circles.
The first set of concerns revolves around the concept of
"accountability" and relates to fundamental notions of democratic
6
practice and the value of unmediated self-governance.
Organizing, as an ideal type, aims to empower the poor and
marginalized to take control over their lives and speak truth
directly to power. As Sanford Horwitt put it in his opening
remarks to this symposium, community organizing aims to
promote citizen participation that transcends any particular issue
around which organizing takes place. I do think that this premise
is worth probing. It has always struck me that, when it comes to
concerns about accountability, organizers frequently get the
benefit of the doubt in that it is presumed that their actions are
perfectly aligned with the community's interests. In contrast,
lawyers, by virtue of their training and professional status, are
presumed to be more prone to client domination.7 Yet it is not clear
that an organizer with a forceful personality like Alinsky does not
also pose similar risks of overreaching. Nonetheless, we tend to
equate organizing with the promise of direct democracy. Lawyers
threaten to break this promise by interposing themselves in a
mediating role. Although such mediation is deemed a virtue by
structural-functionalists who view lawyers as a "balancing wheel"

of social change practice").
5. Shdaimah, supra note 1, at 627.
6. Aziz Rana, Statesman or Scribe? Legal Independence and the Problemof
Democratic Citizenship, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1665 (2009).
7. Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning the
Lessons of Client Narrative, 101 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991); Lucie E. White,
Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the
Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1990).
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in social life, modulating the passions of the masses, such a
conception is anathema to proponents of direct democracy. Legal
action, in this view, may undercut democratic action both because
of the drawn-out and esoteric nature of the legal process, and the
disproportionate influence that lawyers possess as a result of their
monopoly over technical expertise. In the extreme case, lawyers
may use their expertise to disregard community wishes in pursuit
of their own self-defined cause.
The second objection to law focuses on its effectiveness. Here,
the question is: Can law actually deliver social change? As Gerald
Rosenberg powerfully argues, a legal campaign may change law on
the books, but not practice on the ground 8 -the NAACP LDF's
public school desegregation campaign is frequently cited as the
classic example of this. Enforcement of legal mandates is often the
pivotal part of a social change campaign, yet lawyers may not have
the incentives or resources to enforce legal victories over time.
Organizing, from this perspective, may be better situated to
promote sustained activism and thus be more effective in ensuring
long-term change. Moreover, legal action, to the extent that it is
viewed as contrary to the majority will, may be more difficult to
protect from political backlash than law generated through the
democratic process. 9
Both of these concerns-that of unaccountable lawyering and
unenforced law-are real and there are many examples of how
each has hampered social movements. Yet, as Shdaimah reminds
us, neither asserts a categorical bar to legal action. Rather,
concerns about accountability and enforceability alert us to the
risks that reliance on legal action poses. The seriousness of these
risks must be assessed on a case-by-case basis and, once
calculated, weighed against the benefits of legal action. This is, of
course, a very complex process-more art than science. Yet there
are common elements that can be identified and basic trade-offs
that can be evaluated. Once this is done, we may be able to
identify conditions that are conducive to the productive use of legal
action and those that are more threatening to organizing aims. In
general, we would predict that legal action would be more likely to
"make sense" where the risks of unaccountable lawyering were low
or the costs associated with it were relatively small. Similarly, we
would expect that legal action would be more compelling in
situations where legal enforcement either was likely to occur or
was not critical to the success of the campaign.

8. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).

9. See Gerald Rosenberg, Saul Alinsky and the Litigation Campaign to
Win the Right to Same-Sex Marriage,42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 643 (2009).
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CONTEXT FACTORS AFFECTING LAWYER ACCOUNTABILITY

Shdaimah describes two different models of lawyer
accountability, one focused on maximizing client control over
lawyers (what she terms the "Control Model") and the other ceding
some control to lawyers in exchange for leveraging the power of
law to change external conditions (the "Relative Control Model"). 10
But there are many variations. How accountable lawyers are to
organized groups (and how much it matters) depends on a range of
factors, including the type of organizing involved, the type of law
deployed, the identity of the lawyers, and the composition of the
organizing group. In this part, I provide a rough sketch of factors
bearing on the issue of lawyer accountability. In setting out the
list, I start with a series of basic questions and then offer a brief
sketch of the issues, using Shdaimah's case study as an
illustration.
A.

Type of Organizing
* What is the goal of organizing in a particular situation? Is
it a means to an end or is it an end in itself?
" What is the proposed relation of law to the organizing
goals?
* Is law deployed to achieve a particular legal outcome
(policy change) or to stimulate and sustain collective
action?

How law is viewed relative to organizing and the risks it
creates are a function of the goals set for the organizing campaign
in a particular organizing context. Law can be a spur to organizing
or its terminal point (i.e., the creation of law through court order
or legislative enactment).
The South Ardmore case Shdaimah describes was one in
which law was a vehicle for aggrieved community members to
change the outcome of the School Board's redistricting decision.
While it may have also served the goal of activating community
members for more sustained political involvement on education
policy, that was not the primary intent. In this type of a campaign,
in which a group mobilizes to achieve a particular policy outcome,
relying on lawyers may pose less risk if it is deemed that legal
action is the source of greatest political leverage. Since ongoing
mobilization is not the aim, ceding power to lawyers does not
necessarily pose a significant threat to organizing efforts. This
does not mean that the use of law in these circumstances is not
without potential costs. As Shdaimah notes, for Lower Merion
Voices United for Equity (LMVUE), filing a lawsuit meant
forgoing more conciliatory tactics, restricting the speech of group
10. Shdaimah, supra note 1, at 602-07.
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members, and acceding to legal theories (race and disability
discrimination) that did not precisely map onto the group's
experience of injustice. Nonetheless, the group's need to control
the process was less important than its desire to reverse the
redistricting plan.
The South Ardmore campaign may be contrasted with
campaigns in which stimulating organizing or establishing an
organized collective is the endgame, as in a workplace organizing
or popular education campaign. In those instances, turning to law
may pose greater risks to organizing efforts since infusing
community members with a sense of agency is the aim. This, of
course, is also context-specific. As many have noted, litigation can,
in the right circumstances, be used to promote collective action."1
12
And it can also protect activism from repressive responses.
Type of Law

B.

" Does the case involve filing a lawsuit?
" What is the purpose of the suit? Is it an impact suit, aiming
to establish a broad legal principle, or is it designed to
serve a different purpose, such as enforcing a statute or
invalidating a regulation?
* Does the case involve lawyering outside the litigation arena
and, if so, what type? For instance, does the case involve
fact gathering, counseling, deal making, or negotiation in
non-litigation contexts?
" What are the risks to community organizing that nonlitigation approaches pose?
Most analyses of law and social change focus on the role of
litigation, which is the bogeyman of social movements. Shdaimah's
account of LMVUE's decision to retain private counsel to sue the
school board for race and disability discrimination is consistent
with this pattern. As a social change tactic, litigation looms large

11.

See JENNIFER

GORDON,

SUBURBAN

SWEATSHOPS:

THE

FIGHT

FOR

IMMIGRANT RIGHTS (2005); Scott L. Cummings, Hemmed In: Legal
Mobilization in the Anti-Sweatshop Movement, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LABOR
L. (forthcoming 2009).
12. In Los Angeles, for instance, litigation has been essential in protecting
collective action by some low-wage immigrant workers. Day laborers, in
particular, have been subject to local ordinances making it illegal to

congregate in public for the purpose of soliciting work, on the ostensible
grounds that such activities constitute a public nuisance. In response, activists
at the National Day Labor Organizing Network in Los Angeles collaborated

with lawyers at the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund and the ACLU to
successfully challenge ordinances on First Amendment grounds, thus
preserving a key form of organized worker activity. Victor Narro, Impacting
Next Wave Organizing: Creative Campaign Strategies of the Los Angeles
Worker Centers, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 465 (2005-2006).
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both because of the iconic power of judicial decrees in the history of
social movements and also because litigation-or the threat
thereof-is an important negotiating tactic for activists seeking to
change the behavior of public and private actors. Yet litigation is
only one part of what lawyers do. They also counsel organizations
on legal options, draft agreements, and set up organizational
structures. Community economic development is one area in which
lawyers provide transactional assistance to help groups structure
organizations and set up housing and commercial development
13
deals.
In my research on low-wage worker organizing in Los
Angeles, I recounted one campaign of community and labor groups
that sought to negotiate a community benefits agreement from a
publicly subsidized developer of a large sports and entertainment
complex in downtown Los Angeles. 14 There, the coalition relied on
the threat of litigation as leverage, but the primary lawyer
involved conducted many other tasks. He advised the group about
other points of leverage in the land use planning and approval
process; he negotiated with the developer's attorney; and he
drafted the contract that memorialized the community benefits
agreement. I suggested there that the lawyer functioned more as a
campaign strategist than a litigator, guiding the group through
the existing legal framework in order to maximize its power to
achieve its ultimate goal: extracting monetary concessions from
the developer directed toward affordable housing, public space,
and living wage jobs. The potential for lawyers to take too much
control in this type of setting may be less than in the litigation
context, where the lawyer's technical knowledge of the arcane
rules of the forum may be more likely to exclude clients. Some
commentators, however, have suggested that transactional
15
lawyering poses its own risks of disempowering groups.
C.

Type of Lawyers
" Who are the lawyers?
" Where do they work?
" What is their approach to representing community groups?
* Do they charge a fee or provide free services?

13. See Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as
ProgressivePolitics: Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54
STAN. L. REV. 399 (2002).
14. Scott L. Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering: Community Economic
Development in the Figueroa Corridor, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 302 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2006).
15. Daniel Shah, Lawyering for Empowerment: Community Development
and Social Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 217 (1999).
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* Do they share the clients' goals or are they neutral?
Whether or not organizing groups have reasons to mistrust
lawyers depends a great deal on the lawyers in question. The
conception of lawyers as intentionally or inadvertently dominating
has taken on outsized proportions in the scholarly debate about
law and social change. Derrick Bell's famous critique of NAACP
LDF lawyers-as clinging to the integrationist goals of its
desegregation campaign after it became apparent that integration
had lost its appeal with a significant part of the black
community-underscored the dangers of cause lawyering. 16 Lucie
White's depiction of a legal aid lawyer representing a welfare
client, Mrs. G, showed that client domination could occur
inadvertently when a well-meaning poverty lawyer trying to do
her best across the divide of class and race misunderstood the
client's cultural context. 17 These stories no doubt capture
important dynamics within public interest and poverty law.
However, there are also stories of productive legal collaborations
by lawyers sensitive to advancing community interests, suggesting
that the approach of progressive lawyers to client empowerment is
nuanced and complex. There are many lawyers who would prefer
to view themselves as "on tap, not on top."18 Although the lawyer's
self-conception does not eradicate accountability concerns, we
would expect greater lawyer sensitivity to power dynamics within
the lawyer-client relationship to reduce the risk of domination.
D.

Type of Client Group

" What type of community group is it?
" How powerful is it within the local, state, or national
political environment?
" Who are its leaders?
* How much money does it have and what is its source of
funding?
" How familiar are its members with legal processes?
16. Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
17. White, supra note 7.

18. See Sameer Ashar, Public Interest Law and Resistance Movements, 95
CAL. L. REV. 1879 (2007); Jennifer Gordon, The Lawyer Is Not the Protagonist:
Community Campaigns,Law, and Social Change, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2133 (2007);
Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law's "Allurements' A
Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, in
CAUSE
LAWYERING:
POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS
AND
PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES 261 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998); Deborah
Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027
(2008); Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the "Myth of Rights" in Civil Rights and
Poverty Practice,8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 469 (1999).
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" How connected

is the group to a larger network of
movement organizations?

" Is the group coherent or is it loosely structured?
* Does the group operate as part of a coalition?
There are categories of client groups, particularly those
comprised of lower-income and less educated community members,
in which power dynamics make them particularly susceptible to
being taken advantage of by lawyers. But there are, by contrast,
many community groups that are not particularly vulnerable.
More powerful groups with sophisticated leaders-unions, for
example-are less likely to be taken advantage of by lawyers and
more likely to accurately assess the costs and benefits of legal
action. The South Ardmore example is a case in point. There,
LMVUE was a relatively sophisticated group, including
professionals and well-educated academics, including Shdaimah
herself-who, though not a practicing lawyer, is someone deeply
knowledgeable about lawyers and their relationship to social
change. For LMIVUE, the issue was less one of disempowerment
than whether filing a lawsuit would accomplish their ends.
II.

CONTEXT FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGAL

ACTION
This leads to the next set of concerns about the efficacy of law
in achieving social change. Here, I suggest that how effective legal
action may be in advancing specific social change objectives
depends on factors such as the type of problem at issue (and how
amenable it is to easily enforced legal solutions), the type of
outcome sought, and the viability of alternative courses of action.
A.

Type of Problem
" Does the problem require rule change or monetary redress?
" Are the rights in question relatively self-executing or do
they require substantial enforcement efforts?
" If enforcement is required, who would be required to carry
it out? How much discretion would they have? How
resistant would they be?
" How many resources are available to carry out enforcement
efforts? Where would they come from?

In the South Ardmore case, a successful lawsuit would enjoin
the school district from its redistricting plan. That victory would
be relatively easy to enforce because it would simply stop
redistricting from being carried out, thereby allowing parents to
make choices for their children within the pre-existing school
assignment framework. A successful injunction would therefore
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not require a significant additional investment of enforcement
resources.
The necessity, extent, and type of enforcement effort required
in connection with legal action is therefore a key consideration for
organizing groups considering its use. The absence of substantial
post-decision enforcement efforts by the state or individuals makes
legal action more appealing. Same-sex marriage litigation offers
another interesting example in this regard. When successful (and
not subject to political reversal), litigation establishing the right to
same-sex marriage in court empowers individuals to make choices
rather than rely on state officials with significant discretion to
implement. Rather than requiring bureaucratic implementation
(as in the case, for example, of school desegregation), same-sex
marriage rights are relatively self-executing, with individual
couples making the decision to marry and then carrying out the
ministerial tasks of obtaining a marriage license. It is the case
that couples could be blocked by intransigent local officials
unwilling to issue licenses to gay couples, but the experience in
states with same-sex marriage laws suggests that this is not a
significant problem (and one, when it occurs, which can be easily
dealt with through legal channels). It is also possible that states
with judicial decrees establishing same sex-marriage could erect
procedural barriers to make it more difficult for gay couples to
wed-analogous to what states opposed to abortion have done to
make abortion more difficult to obtain as a practical matter
(through parental notification, mandatory waiting periods, and
counseling requirements), while technically complying with the
letter of the law. However, because marriage is available to
heterosexual couples as well, it would be much more difficult to
impose selective impediments to same-sex marriage without
running afoul of a legal mandate requiring it as a matter of equal
rights.
Contrast this with the movement to enforce employment
rights in the Los Angeles garment industry. 19 In that context,
enforcement required individual action by thousands of garment
workers denied minimum wage and overtime. Enforcement was
sought by workers against their individual employers-small
contractors that resisted payment and often went out of business.
California state law allowed workers to recover against larger
garment manufacturers that outsourced production to the
contractors, but they were difficult to identify (contractors, by
design, often did not keep careful records) and frequently refused
to pay. Courts could order the enforcement of unpaid judgments,
but the mechanisms for recovery were weak and the prospect of
delay led many workers to accept deeply discounted settlement

19. Cummings, supra note 11.
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offers. As this example suggests, when systemic enforcement
depends upon large numbers of individual actions against
violators, defendants are relatively powerful and bent on
resistance, and government enforcement mechanisms are weak,
legal action may be less likely to produce the desired results.
B.

Type of Outcome
" If enforcing existing law or creating new law is not the goal
of legal action, what is?
" If legal action is used for public relations purposes, what
are the mechanisms by which the case is designed to
generate publicity?
" What are the audiences the organizing group is trying to
influence? How likely is it that they will be persuaded by
the publicity generated by a lawsuit?
* If legal action is used for community education or as a spur to
community organizing, what are the mechanisms by which
the legal action will be channeled into the education or
organizing efforts?

The enforcement of legal mandates-or the creation of new
law-may not be the goal of legal action. Lawsuits may be brought
to raise the consciousness of aggrieved actors, generate positive
publicity to put pressure on adversaries in ongoing negotiations, or
allow a community group to gracefully exit a losing campaign. In
addition, as the "political trials" of the 1970s demonstrated,
lawyers may manipulate legal processes to highlight official
hypocrisy or underscore fundamental unfairness. When legal
action is not taken to achieve an enforceable legal mandate, then
concerns about its conventional effectiveness (did the lawsuit
result in a "victory") becomes less important-and groups may
often "win by losing" if they are able to use the case for
mobilization purposes. When suits are brought for strategic
reasons other than law creation or enforcement, community
groups choose to target different audiences than judges and state
officials charged with implementing the law. Instead, the message
of the lawsuit is communicated to people in the client community,
other community members who could become political allies (who
Shdaimah calls "bystander publics"), or political decision makers.
This process of translating legal action into a force for broader
mobilization is complex and how one measures "success" is not
always clear. It is often too easy to tell a story of legal action that
results in some type of positive outcome, no matter how
attenuated. When assessing the impact of law on organizing
efforts, it is therefore important to use objective criteria rigorously
applied. Nonetheless, in gauging the effectiveness of law as a
social change tool, the evaluative criteria should permit
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measurement of the actual outcomes that activists are seeking to
achieve.
C.

Alternatives to Legal Action

" What are the strategic alternatives to law?
* What is the likelihood that they will produce different (and
better) outcomes?
" How immune are they to strategic nonenforcement or
political backlash?
Finally, when a group is considering legal action, there is
always the question: As opposed to what? In South Ardmore, legal
action was put on the agenda after unsuccessful efforts to mobilize
concerned parents to attend school board meetings and engage in
lobbying efforts. It was thus considered after non-legal
alternatives failed.
The classic justification for public interest law, particularly
the lawsuits attacking Jim Crow during the Civil Rights
Movement, was the entrenched and immobile political opposition
to the cause of racial equality. Law may be a second-best option,
but sometimes it is the most powerful weapon available. When
organizing groups are contemplating different courses of action,
the use of law must be compared to alternative non-legal
strategies and their likely outcomes. It may be that in a particular
organizing context, law poses significant risks. But what are the
risks of other strategies? How might the risks be weighted and
usefully compared? Realizing Shdaimah's call for a "fluid"
approach to law and organizing requires a genuine analysis of the
trade-offs of legal action and non-legal alternatives and a strategic
plan of action that combines the best of both.

